

CSSN Briefing

Uncovering Climate Obstruction Actors and Discourses in Argentina and Brazil

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Main findings from the Argentinian and Brazilian case studies

Argentina

- There is consensus that Argentina's action on climate change is incipient and lacks comprehensiveness and coordination.
- Climate denial was not identified as a concern prior to the election of President Javier Milei who openly denies anthropogenic climate change.
- The main strategies of climate obstruction are related to economic lobbying against specific climate-related policies particularly in the energy and agricultural sectors.
- Multiple actors assert that carbon-intensive activities are indispensable for solving the country's economic challenges despite the risk of undermining the country's climate goals.
- A counter-narrative with sufficient potency to challenge this dominant discourse is lacking due to the fragmentation of the environmental sector and the absence of a unified diagnosis on how to simultaneously advance climate action and economic development.

Brazil

- The dismantling of Brazil's environmental legislation, spearheaded by the *ruralistas* caucus, the largest group in the national congress, is one of the main features of Brazilian climate obstruction.
- Brazilian agribusiness groups related to squatting and illegal deforestation are the most relevant climate obstruction actors rather than the fossil fuel industry.
- Climate denial in Brazil is more explicitly practiced by far-right actors, a small group of anti-climate activists, and ultra-conservative leaders, but still to a much lesser extent than many parts of the Global North.
- The spread of climate disinformation increased significantly during the government of President Jair Bolsonaro who appointed vocal opponents of climate science to cabinet, and severely weakened environmental governance.
- During his presidency, Bolsonaro's far-right ideology, rhetoric, and behaviour, including climate denial, were not original, but heavily influenced by his international connections, particularly with Donald Trump.

Introduction

Very little is known about climate obstruction in the Global South. Here we present some of the initial findings of a comparative case study project to map climate obstruction actors, their narratives, and strategies in Argentina and Brazil. We define climate obstruction “as intentional actions and efforts to slow or block policies on climate change that are commensurate with the current scientific consensus of what is necessary to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”¹ In the case of Argentina, the study is based primarily on 20 semi-structured interviews with academics, environmentalists, public sector actors and journalists conducted between September 2022 and October 2023. The Brazilian case study used a literature review, analysis of media materials, and 20 semi-structured interviews with government officials, researchers, journalists, and civil society experts conducted between February 2021 and August 2022 during the Bolsonaro administration.

Argentina and Brazil were selected as they represent different and important sites for exploring this agenda. For example, compared to the US's largely corporate-controlled fossil fuel sector, 'state-owned/or partly state-owned energy industries' are dominant in Argentina and Brazil. There is also a specific developmental context that looks different to more advanced economies with significant organized obstruction (i.e., the US). This means that a vision for 'decarbonization' may look different and may impact our understanding of obstruction.

Climate obstruction in Argentina and Brazil also has major consequences for global climate action and the just energy transition. Both countries have vast natural endowments, high levels of biodiversity, and indigenous peoples and other vulnerable communities (such as

quilombolas and *ribeirinhos*, peasants and people living in favelas and villas miseria), who are disproportionately harmed by the climate crisis, extreme events and biodiversity loss, and have their interests/voices marginalized in the political process and policy space.² Argentina and Brazil also have vast agribusiness and mineral extraction complexes and booming fossil fuel production (e.g., Vaca Muerta and Pré-Sal), which means that these sectors matter a great deal for their GHG emissions profiles.

Argentina is the third largest GHG emitter in the region. The main sources of GHG emissions are energy followed by agriculture, livestock, forestry, and other land uses.³ It has consolidated a development model where the agricultural and hydrocarbons sectors play a key role for the economy and the country's exports. In Argentina, former presidents Mauricio Macri and Alberto Fernandez, attempted to position Argentina as a potential bridge-builder at the UN climate negotiations. The oil and gas lobby in Argentina is very powerful and fossil fuel production has been perceived as an engine for rescuing the economy before, during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. While Argentina has committed to reduce GHG emissions by 2030, there is strong pressure to increase the export of natural resources (lithium, copper, gold, oil, gas, grains, etc.) as a source of foreign exchange to support economic recovery. The administration of President Javier Milei, which took office in late 2023, has taken steps to severely weaken the country's climate and environmental agenda.

Brazil is Latin America's largest GHG emitter and among the world's top ten emitters. Brazil has a natural resource-intensive economy with large-scale agriculture, livestock, and deforestation, which combined represented more than two-thirds of the country's GHG emissions in 2021.⁴ It has historically sought to position itself as a leader at the UN climate change negotiations. However, mainly under the Bolsonaro administration (2019-2022), there

was a redoubling of automobile-focused development and oil extraction, a resurgence of deforestation in the Amazon and other biomes, and a savage dismantling of environmental protections. The administration of President Lula, which took office in early 2023, faces myriad challenges including rebuilding environmental protections and climate policy, confronting strong opposition in congress and key state governors (such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais), and managing trade-offs between climate targets, agribusiness interests and the resurgence of oil-drilling in environmentally sensitive areas.

Main findings from the case studies on Argentina and Brazil

Argentina

The study of Argentina captures the perceptions of academics, environmentalists, public sector actors and journalists. These groups represent most of the key voices in setting the agenda of climate action and its dissemination.⁵ The focus on perceptions helps to explain the way in which actors interpret the climate issue and understand climate action and obstruction. An exploration of the knowledge, beliefs and practices of actors vis-à-vis climate change helps to better understand the disputes over this issue.

Most actors perceive that the progress of Argentine climate action is incipient and lacks comprehensiveness and coordination. Second, most actors agreed that climate denialism was not a relevant concern in the country prior to the election of President Javier Milei and his newly created party, La Libertad Avanza. Third, the main strategies of climate obstruction are related to economic lobbying against specific climate-related policies, which reflects the debates where climate action and the imperative of economic growth are pitted against each other.

Two specific mechanisms that connect the narratives with climate obstruction were identified. First, there is a narrative dispute about how the energy transition should occur in Argentina. Several actors identified a strong narrative asserting that certain activities are indispensable for solving the country's economic challenges. Additionally, key actors from the environmental and academic sectors note that a counter-narrative with sufficient potency is yet to materialize to challenge this dominant discourse. This reflects the fragmentation of the environmental sector and the absence of a unified diagnosis on how to simultaneously advance climate action and economic development. Second, nearly all actors identified economic actors who lobby to prevent or undermine climate policies that would affect their interests.

Brazil

The study of Brazil includes perceptions of environmental and climate actors in the country to better understand climate denial, delay and obstruction. It shows that climate denial, delay, and obstruction practices take different forms in Brazil, although as in developed countries, obstruction is also implemented by powerful economic sectors and political actors in key positions in the federal government and national congress.

Climate denial in Brazil is more explicitly practiced by far-right actors, a small group of anti-climate activists, and ultra-conservative leaders (e.g., Ricardo Felício, Evaristo Miranda, Bertrand de Orleans e Bragança, Alain Santos, among others), but still to a much lesser extent than in the Global North. The study shows that actions taken by agribusiness groups and far-right ideological leaders (e.g., Brazilian Rural Society, AgroSur, Brazilian Association of Coal, among others), as well as the implementation of a predatory development model, are the main

factors behind Brazil's delay in advancing an ambitious climate agenda.

The dismantling of Brazil's environmental legislation, spearheaded by the *ruralistas* caucus, the largest group in the national congress, is one of the main features of Brazilian climate obstruction. These economic agents are involved in environmental crimes, mainly related to the invasion of public lands (*grilagem*⁶) and illegal deforestation. Agribusiness and the meat-production industries have political connections with government (e.g., JBS, National Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock and AgroSoja Brazil) and they often try to justify their opposition to more ambitious climate commitments based on state sovereignty, economic development and export-based revenue.

The spread of climate disinformation increased significantly with the arrival of the far-right government under President Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2023). Bolsonaro's far-right ideology, rhetoric, and behavior, including climate denial, were heavily influenced by his international connections, particularly to President Trump. The federal government made repeated use of climate disinformation as a strategy to hinder policies and public debates on the climate emergency. Bolsonaro appointed ministers who publicly denied climate change. These included Ricardo Salles, who has strong connections to the *ruralistas*, as Minister of the Environment, Teresa Cristina as Minister of Agriculture, and Ernesto Araújo, known as anti-multilateralism and anti-globalism as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Environmental governance was weakened in several ways including by adopting less ambitious emission targets, violating the Paris Agreement, freezing the Amazon Fund, and reducing budgets and human resources of climate and environmental institutions.

Why this new research matters for policy debates in Argentina and Brazil today

These case studies matter today for climate, environmental and energy-related policy debates in Argentina and Brazil.

Argentina

The climate denial of President Milei and steps by his administration to weaken the country's climate and environmental policy suggest climate obstruction is shifting into a high gear in Argentina. President Milei has called climate change a "socialist lie" and denied that humans are causing it, despite the scientific consensus that human activities are primarily responsible.⁷ Despite saying initially that his government would remain in the Paris Agreement and not drop its pledge to achieve net zero emissions by 2050, following the re-election of Donald Trump in 2024, President Milei has said he is reconsidering whether to abandon the agreement.⁸ This decision would need to be approved by the national congress. In a worrying sign, the Milei administration ordered Argentinian negotiators at COP29 in 2024 to withdraw from the negotiations.⁹

Mr. Milei is also attempting to roll back environmental protections, which threaten glaciers and forests as part of his agenda to reduce the state and public spending, fight inflation and rekindle economic growth. President Milei dissolved the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development and created an undersecretariat of the environment within the Ministry of the Interior.¹⁰ The Milei administration strongly backs investment in fossil fuels, especially in the Vaca Muerta field, which has been described as a global carbon bomb, and which would use up over 11% of the global CO₂ budget to limit global warming to 1.5 °C.¹¹ In 2024, the administration approved a new

investment regime offering tax, trade and foreign-exchange for projects valued over US\$200 million in various sectors including forestry, mining, and oil and gas.¹¹ Meanwhile, there appears to be little interest in promoting domestic renewable energy. Regarding lithium production, the government is keen to promote foreign investment in the mining sector primarily to boost economic growth rather than out of any conviction to support the global energy transition.¹³

President Milei's climate denial and affinity with President Trump could propel him to attempt to abandon the Paris Agreement. However, the risk of losing important flows of climate finance into the country and Argentina's complex trade relations with the European Union and China, both in favor of the Paris Agreement, will likely prevent the administration from leaving.¹⁴ The country's climate and environmental actors would also likely push back against this move and the legislative hurdles are daunting. Nonetheless, the country's climate policy agenda appears fragile.

In the short term, it is also unclear whether the Milei administration will participate in COP30 this November. He is Argentina's first president who has, so far, not paid an official bilateral visit to Brazil's president, although he accepted an invitation to participate in the G20 meetings in Rio de Janeiro last year. In 2025, all countries party to the Paris Agreement are expected to present their third Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) or national climate plans showing how they will reduce their emissions and adapt to impacts. Recent reports suggest that Argentina will present its new plan towards the middle of this year.¹⁵ However, given Milei's anti-climate agenda, it is highly unlikely that Argentina will present a more ambitious plan than its previous contribution, categorized as "critically insufficient", by Climate Action Tracker, which analyses countries' climate plans and their alignment with Paris Agreement.¹⁶ It is possible that those actors pushing for

carbon-intensive activities to support the country's economic prospects may push to reduce or undermine Argentina's climate commitments further. The lack of a robust narrative to challenge the indispensable nature of carbon-intensive activities due to the fragmentation of the environmental sector suggests resistance to abandoning the Paris Agreement and enthusiasm for pushing for greater climate action might be limited.

Brazil

President Lula has placed climate change and the environment among his top priorities following his re-election in 2022. As a result, high-level climate denial actors in federal ministries have been removed, yet while they may be out of government, they are not silent. The Ministry of Environment was renamed as the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, with environmental leader, Marina Silva, as minister and Ana Toni, who founded the Institute for Climate and Society, as director of climate change policies.

The Lula administration has pledged to eliminate deforestation by 2030. Deforestation over the course of 2023 and 2024 has fallen drastically.¹⁷ In August 2023, Brazil announced an Ecological Transformation Plan based on six pillars, including sustainable funding, technological development, bioeconomy, energy transition, circular economy, and infrastructure and adaptation to climate change.¹⁸ Brazil was one of the first countries to announce its third national climate plan to the Paris Agreement in November 2024. It has set an economy-wide target to reduce its GHG emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035.¹⁹ However, at present, Brazil's emission reduction targets are not aligned with limiting global heating to 1.5°C and remains silent on the country's major plans to expand fossil fuel production.²⁰

In 2024, the country chaired the G20, where it included climate change among its top

priorities. The G20 Final Declaration reaffirms members' strong commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement.²¹ However, Brazil's presidency of the G20 showed that neither Argentina or Brazil are willing to push for or support ambitious language on transitioning away from fossil fuels, aligning with the disappointing COP28 outcomes. In 2025, Brazil will host the BRICS+ Summit in July then COP30 in November, which will take place at a critical juncture following the return of President Trump to the White House. In January 2025, seasoned climate diplomat, Ambassador André Aranha Corrêa do Lago, the current secretary of Climate, Energy and Environment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ana Toni, the National Secretary for Climate Change at the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change, were appointed as the president and executive director of COP30 respectively.²²

Despite these advances, President Lula and other political leaders' enthusiasm to develop Brazil's fossil fuels paint a troubling picture. While Brazil produces most of its electricity from hydroelectric power and has secured major investments in solar and wind projects, it is now the world's eighth-largest oil producer and the largest in Latin America with further expansion planned. In December 2023, the Brazilian government auctioned off more than 602 blocks for oil and gas exploitation with a third of the blocks awarded to 19 companies that have committed to investing more than US\$400 million.²³ Dubbed the "End-of-the-World" auction by Brazilian NGOs, the auctioned areas impact Indigenous peoples and other traditional communities, protected areas in the Amazon, and coral reefs and marine biodiversity hotspots.²⁴ In February 2025, Brazil also approved joining the OPEC+ group of oil-producing countries.²⁵ The national oil company, Petrobras, hopes to commence exploratory drilling in 2025 near the mouth of the Amazon River if it gains authorization from the environmental protection agency, Ibama.

President Lula has reportedly been pressuring Ibama to authorize the license for Petrobras to proceed.²⁶

Other government ministries and agencies are also advancing environmentally damaging projects, including road building in the Amazon, legalizing illegal land claims on government land and authorizing hundreds of dangerous agricultural chemicals.²⁷ Opposition ultraconservative parties, which control Brazil's congress, have also passed legislation weakening protections for the environment and indigenous communities.

Brazilian civil society groups are criticizing the government's contradictory discourse on climate change while promoting fossil fuels, which could undermine President Lula's leadership aspirations for COP30.²⁸ Despite Brazil having a secretariat for the energy transition, the country lacks a plan to phase-out fossil fuels. In addition, the emissions from increased fossil fuel production could cancel out or even surpass the gains made from Brazil's efforts to end deforestation by 2030.²⁹

President Lula's strong backing of fossil fuels is connected to his legacy as a union leader and outdated thinking that exploiting fossil fuels is the only route to prosperity. This viewpoint is shared by some members of his cabinet, who are highly influenced by Latin American developmentalism and economic and industrial traditions. The Minister of Mines and Energy, Alexandre Silveira, is keen to accelerate fossil fuel development, for example. He often refers to Global North countries' return to fossil fuels as a motivation for Brazil not to abandon its oil-drilling plans. The Perseu Abramo Foundation of the Workers' Party also supports these claims by means of developmentalist banners, such as *O Petróleo é Nosso* (Oil is Ours).³⁰

At COP30, Brazil will be able to showcase its advances on reducing Amazonian deforestation

in particular, which will likely positively impact its role as COP president. It will also bring to the forefront leaders from indigenous and traditional communities as key voices of the South American Pan-Amazon region. However, the Lula government's efforts to expand fossil fuel production could undermine its enthusiasm and credibility to build on the decision made at COP28 in 2023 calling on countries to transition away from fossil fuels.³¹ Brazil will not be able to meaningfully advance the negotiations unless it also tackles the need to accelerate the shift away from burning fossil fuels, which is the main driver of the climate crisis. In this respect, Brazil is not alone in the international realm.

Recommendations for academia and civil society

Academia and think tanks

The Argentinian and Brazilian case studies demonstrate the need for climate obstruction literature to consider variations in narratives, actors and practices that are highly dependent on national contexts, particularly in the Global South. In both countries, and the rest of Latin America, the legacy of developmentalism, the non-progressive socioeconomic profile of elites and persistent social inequalities have underwritten national trajectories and are fundamental to understanding climate obstruction and its intersectionality with climate injustice today.

Regarding Argentina, there are various avenues for future research. First, a more systematic understanding of lobbying against climate action is needed. Second, a theoretical and empirical effort is required to differentiate between strategies of climate obstruction and denial, to understand how they work and the nature of their effects. Finally, research should explore how the administration of President Javier Milei and its rhetoric might influence the perceptions of other actors and potentially

initiate a new phase of contestation between pro-climate and anti-climate views.

In Brazil, there are numerous areas of research to explore including how climate obstruction actors access and operate in institutional spaces and multilateral negotiations. Second, an exploration of how they produce government changes in positions on foreign policy and cooperation is required. Third, an effort is needed to understand how these actors manage to convince citizens and voters during electoral campaigns that the climate crisis is a matter of economic freedom and individuals' rights, rather than global scientific consensus. Fourth, very little is known about the influence of religious narratives among Brazilian elites opposing environmental and climate agendas. Lastly, future research is necessary to explore the connections between climate obstruction, illegal activities and environmental crimes.

In both countries, research on the role of transnational actors and their relationships with obstruction narratives and practices is warranted. This should seek to uncover transnational links between non-state actors and international organizations, including think tanks in the Atlas Network, Multilateral Development Banks and other international financial institutions. Moreover, insights into the trade and investment ties in the agricultural, defense, energy and transport sectors between these countries and their partners in the Global North and the Global South would be helpful.

At universities in Argentina and Brazil, the inclusion of new academic research in curriculums is also important. For instance, academics from Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ) and the National University of San Martín, which developed the studies outlined here, are incorporating research results from this project into their international and inter-institutional postgraduate course (MA and PhD) on Environmental Politics and Climate Change in Latin America. New postgraduate and

graduate courses are taking climate obstruction seriously in the debates with students and future researchers. Also, UERJ's Interdisciplinary Observatory on Climate Change has launched an online and open course on the Climate Emergency, whose introductory module deals with climate obstruction in one of its five online classes.³²

Civil society, foundations and journalists

For civil society groups in Argentina and Brazil, there is an urgent need to raise awareness and advance dialogue with local and international partners to deepen understanding and to develop policy related research and campaigns to confront climate obstruction. Tasks include exploring existing climate obstruction discourses and narratives in these countries and creating maps of the relevant actors and their networks.³³ These tasks are essential to raise awareness of these actors and networks and begin to challenge them through the creation of counter-discourses and narratives and other campaigns.

International foundations could do more to encourage and finance civil society groups and specialized journalists in these countries to document climate obstruction actors and their activities. Given the powerful networks at play and the history of violence against those exposing social and environmental damages, special consideration needs to be made to ensure their safety.

In Brazil, civil society can also play a role in helping to build consensus around a more ambitious position on climate change and a just energy transition. The run-up to COP30 will be a key opportunity to raise political awareness about climate obstruction actors, their narratives, discourses and activities with the overall aim of ensuring that these actors do not undermine the COP or hamstring domestic

efforts to leverage the conference to boost national climate and environmental actions. For instance, constructive alliances around climate information integrity, involving civil society, the government and the justice system, may be an avenue for fighting against disinformation.³⁴

Final thoughts

The case studies on Argentina and Brazil show that while these countries have important differences, climate denial and obstruction are occurring in both countries, with disastrous implications for confronting the climate and ecological crises. With the return of President Trump in January 2025, there is a considerable risk that climate denial and obstruction activities will be strengthened, especially in Argentina, where the US finds a willing ally. Meanwhile, in Brazil, where Bolsonaro is no longer president, his followers pursuing climate obstruction remain active across social networks and have important ties with powerful political players in congress, subnational governments, and agribusiness. President Lula's embrace of fossil fuels also represents a different type of climate obstruction, embedded in developmentalism and economic and industrial traditions, which needs to be better understood and confronted. To ensure COP30 is a success, the Brazilian government and its partners will have to ensure that climate science guides the negotiations, rather than politically convenient compromises, which could spell disaster for the fate of the Amazon and countless vulnerable people around the world from worsening climate impacts. These case studies provide a useful starting point towards improving our understanding of how climate obstruction works in Argentina and Brazil, and the steps required to begin to confront it, during yet another crucial year for climate action.

Notes

¹ Brulle, R. J., Roberts, J. T., & Spencer, M. C. (Eds.). (2024). Climate Obstruction across Europe. Oxford University Press. Page 6

² Brazil is home to 60% of the Amazon rainforest, has an estimated 15-20% of the world's biological diversity and more than 200 groups of indigenous peoples. Argentina is also one of the most biodiverse countries in the world and has important water reservoirs and valuable natural landscapes with little human intervention

³ Argentina's Ministry of Environment (2019):

https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/inventario_de_gei_de_2019_de_la_republica_argentina.pdf.

⁴ SEEG. (2023: 6). Análise das emissões de gases de efeito estufa e suas implicações para as metas climáticas do Brasil, 1970-2022. <https://www.oc.eco.br/wpcontent/uploads/2023/03/SEEG-10-anos-v4.pdf>

⁵ Business and industrial actors were also approached for the study yet declined the invitation to participate.

⁶ 'Grilagem' is the invasion of public lands, usually, indigenous lands and conservation units, followed by deforestation and the illegal registry of that same land under the 'ownership' of the invaders or third parties. Once the illegality is covered by a document stating land ownership, rural producers buy it and start operating their businesses legally.

⁷ Climate denial in the Casa Rosada: Milei's arrival puts Argentina's environmental agenda at risk:

<https://english.elpais.com/climate/2023-11-30/climate-denier-in-the-casa-rosada-mileis-arrival-puts-argentinas-environmental-agenda-at-risk.html>

⁸ Milei says he's considering taking Argentina out of Paris Agreement:

<https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/argentina/milei-says-hes-considering-taking-argentina-out-of-paris-agreement.phtml>

⁹ El Gobierno de Milei retira a la delegación argentina de la COP29: ¿qué implica realmente?

<https://climatica.coop/gobierno-milei-retira-argentina-cop29/>

¹⁰ Balance ambiental de Argentina 2024: el primer año de gobierno de un presidente negacionista que sostiene que la economía está por encima de la naturaleza:

<https://es.mongabay.com/2024/12/balance-ambiental-argentina-2024-presidente-negacionista-sostiene-que-economia-esta-por-encima-de-naturaleza/>

¹¹ Vaca Muerta is a "carbon bomb" that could eat up more than 11% of the global CO₂ budget:

<https://350.org/vaca-muerta-is-a-carbon-bomb/>

¹² Argentina's new investment promotion regime: key points:

<https://www.eiu.com/n/argentinas-new-investment-promotion-regime-key-points/>

¹³ How Will Lithium Shape Argentina's Economic Recovery?

<https://thedialogue.org/analysis/how-will-lithium-shape-argentinas-economic-recovery/>

¹⁴ Risk of financial fallout may deter Argentina from leaving Paris Agreement:

<https://www.climatechangenews.com/2025/02/28/risk-of-financial-fallout-may-deter-argentina-from-leaving-paris-agreement/>

¹⁵ América Latina prepara nuevos planes climáticos mientras aumentan las emisiones:

<https://dialogue.earth/es/clima/america-latina-ndc-planes-climaticos-emisiones/>

¹⁶ Climate Action Tracker Argentina Profile: <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/argentina/>

¹⁷ Amazon deforestation in Brazil plunges 31% to lowest level in 9 years:

<https://news.mongabay.com/2024/11/amazon-deforestation-in-brazil-plunges-31-to-lowest-level-in-9-years/>

¹⁸ Brazil's Ecological Transformation Plan:

<https://www.gov.br/fazenda/pt-br/aceso-a-informacao/acoes-e-programas/transformacao-ecologica/english-version/documents/pte-19-10-2023-ecological-transformation-plan.pdf>

¹⁹ Brazil's Third NDC:

https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%2028NDC%29_November2024.pdf

²⁰ NDC misaligned with Lula's promises, says OC:

<https://www.oc.eco.br/en/ndc-misaligned-with-lulas-promises-says-oc/>

²¹ G20 Final Declaration: <https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/media/18-11-2024-declaracao-de-lideres-g20.pdf>

²² Ambassador André Corrêa do Lago chosen as president of COP30:

<https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2025/01/ambassador-andre-correa-do-lago-chosen-as-president-of-cop30>

²³ Brazil holds oil auction just as climate summit comes to an end

<https://english.elpais.com/climate/2023-12-14/brazil-holds-oil-auction-just-as-climate-summit-comes-to-an-end.html>

²⁴ Brazil's "End-of-the-World" auction for oil and gas drilling:

<https://news.mongabay.com/2023/12/brazils-end-of-the-world-auction-for-oil-and-gas-drilling-commentary/>

²⁵ Brazil to join OPEC+, group of major oil-exporting nations:

<https://apnews.com/article/brazil-oil-opec-cop30-lula-3437780649f1d02bb041bd786131062e>

²⁶ Lula jeopardizes own leadership at COP30 in dash for oil:

<https://www.oc.eco.br/en/lula-jeopardizes-own-leadership-at-cop30-in-dash-for-oil/>

²⁷ Brazil's "End-of-the-World" auction for oil and gas drilling:

<https://news.mongabay.com/2023/12/brazils-end-of-the-world-auction-for-oil-and-gas-drilling-commentary/>

²⁸ Lula jeopardizes own leadership at COP30 in dash for oil:

<https://www.oc.eco.br/en/lula-jeopardizes-own-leadership-at-cop30-in-dash-for-oil/>

²⁹ "Brazil's Lula takes heat on oil plans at UN climate talks, a turnaround after hero status last year"

<https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-12-09/brazils-lula-takes-heat-on-oil-plans-at-un-climate-talks-a-turn-around-after-hero-status-last-year.html>

³⁰ See:

<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/painel/2025/02/revista-do-pt-usa-slogan-da-era-vargas-para-defender-exploracao-de-petroleo-na-amazonia.shtml>. See also:

<https://pt.org.br/focus-brasil-margem-equatorial-o-petroleo-e-nosso/>

³¹ At COP29 in 2024, countries were unable to reach an agreement on how the outcomes of the "global stocktake" agreed at COP28 in 2023 (which includes the pledge to transition away from fossil fuels) should be taken forward and therefore it has been left for COP30 to take up again. For further details see the Carbon Brief article on the COP29 Outcomes: <https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop29-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-baku/>

³² Further details: <https://obsinterclima.eco.br/en/teaching-modules/>

³³ See for example Desmog's mapping of industry groups seeking to influence the recent UN Biodiversity Conference:

<https://www.desmog.com/2024/10/28/mapped-how-big-ag-pharma-pesticides-and-other-industries-hope-to-sway-the-un-biodiversity-talks/>

³⁴ See for instance: <https://ciis.caad.info/>.

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