CHAPTER 8

Climate Obstruction Across the Global South

LEAD AUTHORS: M. OMAR FARUQUE AND RUTH E. McKIE
CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS: LUCAS G. CHRISTEL, CLAIRE DEBUCQUOIS, GUY EDWARDS, PAUL K. GELLERT, RICARDO A. GUTIERREZ, KATHRYN HOCHSTETLER, YIFEI LI, CARLOS R. S. MILANI, ELISABETH MÖHLE, OLUWASEUN J. OGUNTUASE, AND JONATHAN R. WALZ

INTRODUCTION: DEFINING THE GLOBAL SOUTH

The Global South refers to countries, societies, and political economies situated in the "periphery" and "semi-periphery" of global capitalism in the regions of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Oceania. A shared feature of these countries is their economic and political marginalization compared with their counterparts in the Global North (i.e., the "core" countries in North America and Europe).[1] Although the most common conceptualization of the Global South is a narrow scholarly and policy definition focusing on the nature and dynamics of development in those countries, the term also encompasses geopolitical power relations.[2] Scholars have argued that the Global South "functions as more than a metaphor for underdevelopment. It references an entire history of colonialism, neo-imperialism, and differential economic and social change through which large inequalities in living standards, life expectancy, and access to resources are maintained."[3]

Culturally and politically, the Global South countries are non-Western (multicultural and multinational) societies with different trajectories in state formation. Most countries in the Global South are former colonies of Western powers, and they are usually either excluded from key international

M. Omar Faruque et al., *Climate Obstruction Across the Global South*. In: *Climate Obstruction*. Edited by: J. Timmons Roberts, Carlos R. S. Milani, Jennifer Jacquet, and Christian Downie, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press (2025). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197787144.003.0008

decision-making processes or play significantly less powerful roles in post-1945 multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The term often expresses commonality among developing countries in terms of their conflicting interests with the industrialized countries of the Global North. This North-South conflict feature also applies to global climate governance and politics.[4] However, contemporary political dynamics in the area of global climate governance demonstrate that the Global South countries are socially, politically, and economically diverse, thus making the Global South a fragmented entity.[5] The Global South should therefore be viewed "as a complex and changing set of relations reflecting shifts in the historic world order, and dynamics specific to the contemporary climate regime."[6]

Climate obstruction and delay in the Global South manifest in qualitatively different ways from that in the Global North. State actors in the Global South tend to set climate governance and policy agendas that reflect their structural and economic positions in relation to global climate governance and politics. Many countries in the Global South defend their less ambitious climate actions by invoking arguments underpinned by unequal historical emissions of GHGs and differentiated responsibilities as set out in the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This position is further entrenched by their strong commitment to the "right to development" to ensure energy security, encouraging other actors and organizations in core economic sectors to support policies and actions that fall far short of addressing the climate crisis. Furthermore, the failure of advanced industrial countries of the Global North to deliver their repeatedly promised financial support has created a policy context in the Global South whereby obstructive actors raise the need to fulfill this commitment before they can undertake much-needed climate action. Civil-society actors also invoke narratives of "climate injustice" to draw attention to such failures and, in so doing, indirectly support climate obstruction.

The remainder of this chapter is organized into four sections and a conclusion. It begins by explaining major considerations that distinguish the Global South from the Global North in ways that affect these countries' approach to dealing with climate change, and how these approaches lead to obstruction. Next, we identify key actors and organizations undertaking climate obstruction activities in core economic sectors of the Global South. The next section examines the political aims of these actors, their alliances with other actors and organizations (including those based in the Global North), and the strategies, tactics, and narratives they deploy to undermine climate-related legislative and policy actions. This analysis is followed by a brief discussion of the role of civil-society actors and social movements in contesting the policies and actions of government agencies and carbon majors in the Global South. It also

emphasizes the challenges they face in achieving rapid climate action. Finally, the chapter summarizes our key findings on climate obstruction in the Global South and discusses research gaps and policy lessons.

MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING CLIMATE OBSTRUCTION IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

This section argues that there are five major considerations affecting climate obstruction in the Global South. This section reviews these five different areas and considers what this means for our understanding of climate obstruction in the Global South.

Variations in National Climate Commitments

The Global South countries are heterogenous in terms of their policies to address climate adaptation and mitigation. There are sharp disagreements among stakeholders regarding what constitutes a just transition toward a sustainable energy future, as illustrated by the variety of commitments outlined in the Paris Agreement. Many countries in the Global South are at a disadvantage in terms of economic growth, development, and social justice. These concerns are often given primary consideration in making climate and energy policies. For example, some African stakeholders consider addressing energy poverty at any cost to be a top priority. Decarbonization, in their view, is not an urgent matter for many African countries. Indeed, balancing the goals of ensuring energy security to meet the desired goals of high economic growth (and improving human development) with the need to take climate action is a dilemma for many countries in the Global South. There is also a divide between the elite and the masses in terms of preferred policy choices to address the climate crisis. For example, most people in Colombia support the government's strict measures to combat climate change by moving toward renewable energy systems. However, the elites within and beyond the current ruling class under the Gustavo Petro administration defend the continued use of oil and gas reserves.[7]

Countries in the Global South also differ in their positions on global climate governance negotiations. Although they remain committed to advancing a common goal, power differentials and national interests have created rifts among them. Similarly, although this chapter presents examples of climate obstruction from various regions in the Global South, they also manifest in distinct ways. This reality points to the fact that the Global South is not just a geographical category; but more importantly, a geopolitical and political

economic category whose members can be differentiated by their wealth and resources and by their structural position in the world economy and in global governance.

Unequal Vulnerability to Climate Change

While Global South countries are *least* responsible for the historical rise in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, scientific evidence shows that countries in the Global South are the *most* vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.[8] Yet many of these countries bear significantly less responsibility for the problem's causes than countries in the Global North.[9] At the same time, wealthier countries in the Global North have disproportionately exploited natural resources and damaged institutional capacity in these countries.[10] The consequences of this exploitation have made many such countries more vulnerable than those in the Global North to the effects of climate change. Nations of the Global South also suffer from inadequate resources and technical capacity to counter these historical and ongoing harmful practices. In response to the structural conditions imposed by the Global North, some countries in the Global South have prioritized centralized models of economic development focusing primarily on government-led allocation and development of resources that often lead to the sidelining of climate and other environmental policies.[11]

Differentiated Responsibilities in the International Climate Arena

Despite their limited historical role in causing the climate crisis, Global South countries are entitled to send delegates representing their interests to the annual UNFCCC negotiations and to participate in decision-making on global climate governance strategies.[12] Moreover, all countries in the Global South except Iran, Libya, and Yemen have signed the Paris Agreement committing themselves to Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), which require their governments to make self-determined pledges detailing their intended actions to help mitigate and adapt to climate change.[13]

Acknowledging the discrepancies between countries' past roles in rising GHGs emissions and their current capacities to address them, the UNFCCC introduced the concept of "fair share" and "differentiated responsibility" for GHG reductions (Articles 3 and 4). This nonbinding approach to ensuring equity, as laid out in the Paris Agreement, accounts for countries' historical emissions, current resources, and development needs in determining their response to climate change (Article 4). In this way, the

process considers how Global South countries differ from those in the Global North, and accordingly suggests their expected contributions moving forward.

Given that countries across the Global South are more vulnerable to climate change than the Global North and have less capacity to respond to it, they have called on the international community to supply specific types of economic and financial aid and technology transfer to support their adaptation and mitigation efforts.[14] In recent years, "loss and damage" has emerged as a "third pillar" of global climate governance.[15] The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) describes loss and damage as "harmful impacts or risks that can result from climate change-related slow onset hazards and extreme weather events,"[16] and refers to "the unavoidability and irreversibility of certain climate change impacts and the role played by constraints and limits to adaptation as drivers of adverse outcomes."[17] However, the implementation of this policy has been plagued by the failure of countries in the Global North, which actively sought to avoid such financial obligations, to limit the scope of what is considered loss and damage, and to stall negotiations by aiming to achieve word-perfect policy proposals.[18]

Furthermore, to meet global climate treaty commitments, a just transition and the development of sustainable economies in the Global South must be a priority. In practice, appropriate climate policies in these countries would require implementing, for example, "green" finance initiatives such as green bonds to fund renewable energy projects to help phase out heavily polluting alternatives while also maintaining economic growth. Moreover, this type of climate action "must seek fairness and equity with regards to the major global justice concerns such as (but not limited to) ethnicity, income, gender within both developed and developing contexts"[19] while also minimizing the impacts of climate change. Unfortunately, while the Global South countries claim to recognize the significance of decarbonizing their economies, most of them had not done so by 2019, as illustrated by the absolute rise in their GHG emissions. However, it is important to note that this rise was not distributed equally among countries in the Global South.[20]

The Role of Structural Issues and Geopolitical Shifts in Climate Politics

The existing political, social, and economic conditions in many countries of the Global South have created a complex policy agenda that facilitates climate delay, such that the implementation of policies aiding the energy transition has been slow and its scope is limited. This agenda is driven by traditional notions of development influenced by the market-fundamentalist and

neoclassical economic concepts of progress,[21] which in turn shape climate delay by dismissing the urgency of climate action. This ideology also includes the belief that higher levels of environmental degradation due to industrial development will increase economic growth and ultimately empower Global South countries to mitigate GHG emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change.[22] While this ideology is popular in many Global South countries, discourses of sustainable economic development and post-development also exist. These discourses have served as both a critique of market fundamentalism[23] and a defense of the neo-developmentalism emerging in some Global South countries, which sees an active role for the state in addressing both development and climate change and prioritizes social advancement and inclusivity.[24] Yet a common factor in these various ideologies is the continued use and sometimes expansion of extractive industries for economic development that fail to mitigate the impacts of climate change.

The above discourses are also linked to contemporary geopolitical shifts, as the rise of new development-cooperation mechanisms has lessened the Global South's dependence on the Global North for trade and investment.[25] For example, the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have the potential to reshape global economic governance in light of the climate crisis.[26] More specifically, emerging environmentally friendly technology in BRICS countries, intra-BRICS trade and investment,[27] and the "new development bank"[28] are changing the model of modernization and development advanced by Western countries.[29] New challenges loom with the expansion of the BRICS+ group, which now includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and others. Most importantly, the historical reliance on and the influence of the Global North are fading in these nations. These conditions have changed the landscape in which GHGs emissions have continued to rise over the past one hundred years: emissions in the Global South countries are now increasing, driven by alternative development models, industrialization, and geopolitical relationships. The Global South countries have also caused intentional or unintentional climate obstruction, most often in the name of maintaining their right to economic growth and development, as we will discuss in detail later.

OBSTRUCTIONIST SECTORS, ACTORS, AND ORGANIZATIONS

Various extractive and heavily polluting industries exist across the Global South, with some generating large economic profits for a small monopoly of corporations and/or state actors. This section identifies these key sectors in which powerful actors and organizations play a critical role in shaping climate obstruction.

Multinational Corporations and State Actors

Multinational corporations and state-based actors play a dominant role in climate obstruction activities in the Global South. Across Latin America, the agribusiness sector is one of the most significant contributors to the rise of GHG emissions (see Chapter 4). For example, between 1990 and 2018 agricultural development in carbon-dense tropical forest areas was greatly expanded, driving up emissions from agriculture, forestry, and other land uses (AFOLU) and becoming one of the largest contributors to overall GHG emissions in the region.[30] This ongoing expansion is happening despite that lower-carbon alternatives are already available and/or hold potential to be developed. These conditions align with the activities of climate obstruction actors in the region. For example, in Brazil, the agribusiness sector and other "land-grabbing" enterprises have been key players in Brazilian climate obstruction, delay, and denial.[31] Specific actors include the recent Bolsonaro administration (2019–2023) which oversaw the dismantling of the structures and mechanisms for environmental protection constructed over the previous several decades to boost agricultural development in the Amazon Rainforest.[32]

Rising GHGs emissions in the Global South are also linked to aggressive crude-oil extraction in the Middle East and in North and Northwest Africa, including in several member countries of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).[33] OPEC serves to unify petroleum-producing countries by activating, coordinating, and aligning petroleum policies that aim to stabilize and protect international oil markets so that they remain secure and efficient.[34] Given the UNFCCC's substantial role in determining global energy trends, its actions and the implementation of global mitigation targets can potentially restrain OPEC members' crude-oil extraction and, as a result, various climate obstruction activities have emerged in these countries (see Chapters 2 and 10).

Asian countries have historically made one of the lowest contributions to rising GHGs emissions. However, between 1990 and 2019 their net emissions expanded exponentially.[35] Due to population growth and an increase in economic activities, the region is expected to continue to increase its share on pace with further industrialization, the expansion of agriculture, and increased consumption patterns. In certain cases, some of these countries, such as China and India, are established coal users and will remain so as they continue to phase in coal-powered power plants.[36] The reliance on and expansion of extractive sectors in many of these countries also lead to delaying the shift toward renewable energy and robust climate action.

Notably, most of the countries phasing out coal are in the Global North and those countries phasing-in coal are in the Global South, particularly in Asia.[37] For example, Indonesia is now one of the world's top contributors to global GHG emissions. Its extractive and agro-extractive activities, specifically

coal mines and oil-palm plantations, perpetuate an "extractive regime."[38] In Vietnam and the Philippines, coal remains the primary source of energy, particularly for the electricity sector. Electrification efforts have increased coal consumption in several Southeast and South Asian countries.[39] The share in Vietnam rose to almost 50% before declining since 2021.[40] In the Philippines, coal use continues to rise; its growth has already exceeded 45%.[41] In the South Asian region, Bangladesh has significantly increased the share of coal as a primary energy source for its electricity generation capacities.[42] India's electricity sector also remains a major consumer of coal. More than 48% of its installed power-generation capacity comes from coal-fired power plants.[43] A complex domestic political economy involving mining corporations, public utility companies, and coal-job-dependent communities keeps India as a major consumer of coal, notwithstanding its promise to move toward renewable energy.[44]

In the African continent, South Africa is one of the major economies most dependent on coal for electricity generation, with the energy sector accounting for some 80% of its GHG emissions. Yet despite calls for a transition to renewable energy as early as 1999,[45] wind and solar power remain a small part of South Africa's electricity supply.

In essence, development and industrialization in the Global South are at odds with important elements of climate action. While the use of fossil fuel offers a pathway forward as part of these countries' development, this policy choice is incompatible with the goals of the Paris Agreement and what science shows is needed to ease the climate crisis. Furthermore, it has created a form of carbon lock-in: manufacturing industries, power plants, and economies based on fossil fuels have led to a pattern of investments that cannot easily be altered without a significant impact on development in Global South countries.[46] Ultimately, the entanglement between the fossil fuel sector and these countries' economies serves to restrict robust climate action and a just green transition.

Industry Lobbyists and Business Associations

There is also evidence that industry lobbyists and business associations have influenced climate obstruction in some Global South countries. For example, while the perspectives of industry lobbyists working to undermine or slow progress at the UNFCCC negotiations are often considered authoritative views on various policies, the demands and concerns of environmental and social activists, Indigenous peoples, and subnational actors attending these negotiations are typically ignored or weakened, thus also weakening their ability to influence the proceedings.[47] The industries' authoritative views often align with those of government leaders seeking to protect polluting and extractive activities and are reiterated in national and global forums. The case

of Indonesia provides a good example, wherein corporate influence is exercised through business-sector associations, notably the Chamber of Commerce, and industry-wide associations, such as the Indonesian Coal Mining Association (APBI-ICMA).[48] In Bangladesh, an industry group, the Bangladesh Independent Power Producers' Association (BIPPA) downplays the role of renewable energy resources and advocates for more fossil fuel–based power plants to meet the economy's growing energy demands. State agencies operating in an environment characterized by state–business collusive relationships[49] have favored BIPPA's views and offered them various financial incentives denied to entrepreneurs involved with renewable energy projects, thus creating a policy context that obstructs climate actions enabling a transition toward a sustainable-energy future.[50] In India, also, state–business collaboration contributes to "the transition to more fossil fuel energy" in a policy context characterized by "talk renewables, walk coal."[51] Although less-expensive renewable power has begun to undercut the price of coal-fired power, India "face[s] resistance from a coal lobby which controls vast budgets and employs millions."[52] The relationships and interests shared by industry lobbyists, business associations, and the state guide the narratives that play out in the UNFCCC negotiations, diminishing the positions of environmental and social activists, Indigenous peoples, and other actors who seek to accelerate decarbonization.

Labor Movements and Unions

Labor movements and unions in the workplace also play a role in climate obstruction in some Global South countries. For example, in 2018, the organized labor movement in South Africa reversed its positions of support for the implementation of a Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers Procurement Program (REIPPPP), which used auctions to select builders of renewable-electricity plants under long-term power purchase contracts. The labor movement represents one of the largest and most important social bases of the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa's social-democratic political party, which played an essential role in anti-apartheid struggles of the 1990s. While labor initially supported climate action in 2011, they eventually resisted the implementation of the REIPPPP because it specified that electricity generation should be controlled and managed by the public sector rather than via the proposed outsourcing program to private organizations. This position was partly ideological and partly based on a conviction that only the public sector could maintain high-quality and well-paying energy jobs at scale. With comparatively few jobs available in the renewables sector at that time, organized labor in South Africa reoriented to protecting existing coal mining, transport, and power-generation jobs.[53]

POLITICAL AIMS, ALLIANCES, AND NARRATIVES

Actors and organizations engaged in climate obstruction in the Global South have a variety of political aims. Depending on the nature of these goals, they form alliances with other actors and organizations and deploy various narratives to stall climate mitigation efforts. These aims, alliances, and narratives are concerned primarily with maintaining the relationship between fossil fuel–dependent extractive industries that shape domestic policy decisions and building transnational relationships to increase economic development and maintain energy security. This section presents cases from different regions of the Global South to elucidate the political aims and strategies of climate obstruction actors in the sectors discussed earlier and the narratives they deploy to advance their climate obstruction agenda.

Extractive Industry and the Pull of Development Rhetoric

Southeast Asia has embraced the rhetoric of commitment to climate change mitigation goals. Yet there is doubt whether such rhetoric will—or is intended to—be transformed into concrete strategies and actions. For example, climate delay in Southeast Asia is generally shaped by the urgency of development. This ambition includes efforts to bring electricity to whole populations and must contend with the high cost of electricity, the unreliability of transmission, and the problem of power interruptions. Continuing to exploit traditional fossil fuels to meet these growing needs means that the adoption of alternative sources of energy to match the urgency of decarbonization may be sidelined. Climate delay is also shaped by the huge scale of investments needed to develop renewable and sustainable energy sources in the Global South.[54] In parts of Africa, political leaders and the carbon majors continue to echo discourses of climate delay at local and international forums. They assert that the African continent is best equipped to determine how to meet its climate commitments and has the right to chart its own energy path and decide how to balance economic development with sustainability to deliver a better future to its people.[55] This type of obstruction also includes the renegotiation of contracts to procure greater profits from the carbon majors currently operating within their borders, as in the case of Tanzania.[56]

Given that extractive industries are portrayed as the primary tool for development in the Global South, particularly in the elite narratives of governments and corporate executives, it is not surprising to see these narratives implemented in various forms of climate obstruction. One example is the consolidation of South-South cooperation programs. Such programs connect countries in the Global South through knowledge sharing, trade and

investment, aid/financial assistance, and technical collaboration.[57] The practice is also promoted as a way to advance sustainable development and challenge their historical dependence on the Global North.[58] Yet it has also opened opportunities to delay decarbonization and accelerated mitigation efforts.

One such example of South-South cooperation is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a Chinese investment project designed in part to incorporate sustainability strategies into fast-growing economies to help align them with member states' NDCs. The project has succeeded in developing new industries and expanding existing ones in many Global South countries.[59] Because the BRI "is not explicitly a sustainable development project that prioritizes climate change and environmental protection,"[60] however, there has been little movement on renewable energy projects while extractive industries have been expanding. Significantly, the top ten recipients of Chinese finance for coal-fired power plants are in Eurasia, including Indonesia, India, Vietnam, and Pakistan. Moreover, in Bangladesh, which has received both Japanese and Chinese financial and technical support, policymakers and climate change experts consider using coal power to be a viable policy to move toward a low-carbon development path, with the government seeking to ensure its energy security by obtaining climate finance from the international community to build more coal-fired power plants.[61] Therefore, while coal may not be considered a low-carbon-development fuel, it is promoted as a viable "transition fuel." The success of such initiatives is likely due to their business-as-usual approach to coal compared with the strict measures taken by several Western countries to phase out coal. In other words, these South-South corporation programs become attractive opportunities because they both expand economic development and opportunity in Global South countries and create pathways to reduce the dependency of the Global South on the Global North, which represents the continuing legacy of colonial and imperialist power. Furthermore, they also provide the opportunity to counter the perceived or realistic lack of capacity from renewable energy sources and tangible policy support for renewable energy development.[62] As such, these investment programs protect their national economic interests, which is portrayed as the best option to reconcile underdevelopment and historical structural inequalities with current climate mitigation responsibilities.

Energy Poverty and Climate Action

The development narratives associated with energy-transition mechanisms have played an important role in creating and facilitating business opportunities, global partnerships, and green financing in the Global South.

For example, in Argentina, carbon-intensive industries such as agriculture, mining, and shale gas development have been discussed as pathways to solve the country's structural economic issues. Moreover, gas is considered to be a transition fuel, contributing to the global decarbonization process even as it supports development.[63] However, this view contradicts the stance of the International Energy Agency that gas can serve only a limited role in a renewables transition.[64] Rhetoric similar to Argentina's was presented by the former chief executive officer of the Nigerian Petroleum Corporation and former OPEC Secretary General, Mohammad Sanusi Barkindo, during the COP26 meeting in Glasgow in 2021:

> The delicate balance between reducing emissions, energy affordability and security requires comprehensive and sustainable policies, with all voices being heard, and listened to. Focusing on only one of these over the others can lead to unintended consequences, market distortions, heightened volatility and energy shortfalls. We need to ensure energy is available and affordable for all; we need to move towards a more inclusive, fair and equitable world in which every person has access to energy, aligned with SDG [Sustainable Development Goal] 7; and we need to reduce emissions.[65]

In this way, attempts to balance socioeconomic needs and climate action serve as a form of obstruction.

Trade Relations and Transnational Influence

While South-South cooperation programs are expanding, the development-focused narratives discussed earlier support the continuation and growth of Global North-Global South financing, influence, and free-trade relationships that result in climate obstruction. Several countries that continue to export, consume, and phase in coal are in the Global South.[66] Therefore, for some countries in the region, choosing to expand coal use or other heavily polluting industries is a priority to ensure economic growth, sometimes in unsustainable ways, because of its importance for global trading partnerships. For example, in Indonesia, coal and palm oil are important commodities for both domestic consumption and for export. Due to deforestation concerns, European markets no longer support palm oil-based biofuels, creating the EUDR (European Union Deforestation Rule), which forbids the sale of several tropical commodities if grown on deforested land; the Indonesian government has interpreted the rule as a form of trade war and a threat to its national sovereignty.[67] Thus, while some countries maintain trading relationships based on commodities, such as coal and palm oil, that contribute to expanding

extractive sectors, resistance from powerful transnational forces such as the EUDR serves to partially offset the expansion of these sectors.

Another way the Global North exerts a transnational influence upon the Global South is within the policy sphere. Scholars have identified several members of a coalition of think tanks active within some Global South countries that engage in climate obstruction.[68] Several of these think tanks were part of the now-defunct Civil Society Coalition on Climate Change (CSCCC);[69] a network of organizations formed by a US-based group to challenge the scientific consensus on climate change by creating counterproposals to international efforts and producing media materials to promote climate delay. Located in several countries in the Global South, organizations associated with these think tanks produced op-eds, articles, and policy papers advocating climate delay, mostly reprinted and translated from materials written by US-based authors. One example is the Peruvian think tank Andes Libre, which had previously cited and utilized the work of US-based authors affiliated with Global North organizations considered to be obstructionist.[70] Another example is the Brazil-based Instituto Liberdade, which reproduced the work of the Coalition's first international report in 2007.[71] Similarly, the Nigerian Initiative for Public Policy utilized the work of the CSCCC and promoted the same narratives of climate delay promoted by Global North think tanks noted for climate obstruction (see also Chapter 5). Historically, some of the discourse in these materials was associated with more traditional forms of denialism.[72] More recently, the positions articulated by these think tanks and their affiliated organizations in the Global South have shifted somewhat to frame climate change as best addressed through a free market and decentralized economy with little or no government intervention.[73]

Green Financing and Infrastructure Development

Green financing provided by the Global North to the Global South has operated as a useful tool for some renewable energy development projects. Yet some projects have faced resistance from within these countries due to their seeming incompatibility with achieving climate goals. In Brazil, Ferrogrão, a planned railway line and infrastructure project connecting a series of ports along the Amazon River, was the first project to be approved by the Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI).[74] This project opened up a green-investment pipeline within the framework of a partnership between Brazil's Ministry of Infrastructure,[75] and the country's National Development Bank, with the latter committed to financing up to 70% of the costs. The project was widely promoted at international investor roadshows, kindling the interest of several foreign banks and financial institutions.[76] While Ferrogrão was envisioned as a more

sustainable alternative to the existing transport highway, the railway would cause significantly more emissions through extensive deforestation,[77] contravene international law (specifically the ILO Convention 169, also called the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention),[78] and ignore the rights of Indigenous peoples by failing to consult with them about its development.[79] Ferrogrão illustrates how the domain of green finance is filled with outside actors developing and implementing plans that may not be compatible with domestic government structures, policies, and interests. These plans also ignore or fail to adequately consider other environmental impacts,[80] which may result in inseparable ecological and social impacts. Moreover, the case shows that green finance can be controversial, leading some Global South countries to resist the influence of the Global North as they attempt to shape international climate mitigation efforts that affect them.

Climate Vulnerability and Mitigation Responsibility in Global Talks

Historically, climate negotiation forums such as the UNFCCC have been used by some member countries of the Global South as a collective opportunity to stall measures to mitigate the climate crisis. In this obstruction tactic, delegations present their positions in the negotiating process at the UN climate change conferences to spread discourses of climate delay. For example, India's delegation at COP21 in Paris in 2015 argued that less-developed countries like India should be allowed to continue emitting large amounts of carbon to grow their economies, characterizing its position as "climate justice."[81] However, research on the Indian government's actions at home show no evidence of prioritizing the needs of economically poor and socially marginalized communities, whose lives have become more precarious over a quarter-century of steady economic growth that has increased domestic economic inequalities.[82] Indeed, many countries in the Global South have adopted the UNFCCC's Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) principle (Article 4) as a strategy to delay climate action under the rubric that mitigation (and decarbonization) is the primary responsibility of the Global North. Furthermore, because global climate negotiations require binding pledges from both the Global North and South, leaders of the Global South, citing principles of CBDR, fairness and equity, and/or climate justice, may use the pressure of commitment-making as a strategy of climate obstruction (see Chapter 10).

The international climate forums provide a vital opportunity to disseminate the accurate narrative that many climate-vulnerable countries in the Global South bear little or no responsibility for addressing carbon emissions because of their historically lower contribution to global warming than advanced industrial countries. However, national delegations from these countries often

support their continued reliance on fossil fuels and lack of interest in increasing renewable energy by citing its intermittent nature or their lack of access to new technologies. Such positions have also led to disagreements within negotiating groups representing Global South countries, such as the Group of 77 and China (G77 + China)—especially between major emitters including China, South Africa, India, and Brazil, and the Least Developed Countries and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), which regard climate change as an existential threat.[83] That is, countries in the Global South are heterogenous, yet share a narrative of economic underdevelopment and poverty.[84] Therefore, while their climate obstruction narratives and actions differ depending on their national interests, some shared interests remain; these can lead to the formulation of arguments that can intentionally or unintentionally stall progress on international climate negotiations.

Climate Policy Agendas and the Public–Elite Divide

In Global North countries, a documented gap exists between public opinion favoring climate action and state-corporate activities to address it. Consequentially, while a public appetite exists to transform the energy sector and act on climate change, the vested interests of corporate actors and national governments serve to obstruct policies, thus undermining the public interest.[85] Similar conflicts between the public and elites or between government and industry over the best actions for mitigating climate change and accelerating decarbonization exist in some Global South countries. For example, in response to high levels of deforestation, Colombia has seen a resurgence of government efforts to reduce deforestation and improve governance and security issues in affected rural areas.[86] On the other hand, the Colombian energy sector, particularly the coal industry, remains powerful and is advancing faster than the transition to renewable energy sources.[87] Moreover, while Colombia declared at COP27 that it planned to stop developing oil and gas,[88] unresolved conflicts remain with conservative lawmakers and the state-owned Ecopetrol company, who defend the use of fracking and the maintenance of oil and gas reserves to protect against the projected loss of thousands of jobs and reduced foreign investment, claiming this is a pathway to decarbonization.[89] This elite narrative challenges the public consensus in Colombia. In 2023, a survey conducted by the European Bank noted that 91% of Colombians believe that the government should implement effective measures to combat climate change, with an overwhelming majority preferring renewable energy development.[90]

Another caveat to this conflict between the public and elites is the justification of climate inaction on the basis of sovereignty and energy independence.

This narrative, promoted by governments and elites in Global North countries, advocates climate policies designed primarily to protect national interests, sometimes even by expanding the national/domestic-based extractive sector.[91] A similar narrative has been adopted by some countries of the Global South, despite public support for climate action. As in the case of Colombia, this type of conflict ultimately creates a stalemate that delays a coordinated international effort to address the climate crisis.

Violent Conflict and Illicit Markets in Fragile States

The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) considers how environmental degradation and climate change interact with peace and security issues.[92] Addressing environmental and climate crises requires erecting measures to protect the environment as well as to promote peace in politically complex and fragile contexts. In such contexts, denial or delay of climate action is not necessarily purposeful. Rather, as priorities shift, addressing climate change may seem less urgent. For example, recent research on Yemeni conflict showed that "while the parties involved in the conflict encounter climate-related issues, they put it in the back seat to take the so-called rational path to first and foremost arrive at a political arrangement and dissolve the conflict."[93] In such scenarios, policymakers in countries such as Yemen, South Sudan, Congo, and Syria are unable to pursue climate mitigation policies. While the argument that these are obstruction activities is tenuous, the failure to implement climate-related and energy-transition policies in fragile and conflict-ridden political contexts can delay climate action within certain regions or territories.

In addition to conflict-prone and fragile political contexts, illicit markets can contribute to delaying climate change action in the Global South. For example, legitimizing environmental crimes has been a key feature of climate obstruction in Brazil. Such illicit actions have become socially accepted, with criminal actors occasionally counting on corrupt individuals in key institutional positions to grant them amnesty. This trend began in the 1970s during the military dictatorship under Brazilian armed forces (1964–1985), which encouraged the indiscriminate deforestation and occupation of the Amazon Rainforest to defend the country's sovereignty. Politicians, entrepreneurs, military personnel, civil society groups, and religious leaders defended these land-grabbing practices as necessary for the country's development. The advancement of Brazil's carbon-intensive agricultural frontier in the Amazon and the Cerrado biome, both of which are threatened, is still a well-established practice strongly opposed by environmentalists, organizations, and some politicians.[94]

Global Think Tanks and Climate Policy

Another significant aspect of climate obstruction in the Global South is the influence of powerful think tanks such as the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS) and the Atlas Network. Both are global networks of smaller think tanks known for advancing climate change policy denialism. While the role of these think tanks in delaying climate actions in the Global North is well documented in both scholarly literature and media reports,[95] recent research has revealed their role in strengthening market-fundamentalist neoliberal policies and influencing climate delay in the Global South.[96] Individuals and think tanks in the Global South connected with MPS are known for spreading climate delay discourses and climate science denialism. An example is Instituto Liberdade, a Brazilian think tank that promotes the works of Global North-based climate contrarians in Latin America with a goal of influencing climate change policies to stall climate action.[97]

Another key strategy deployed by Atlas-connected think tanks in the Global South is to demonize climate and environmental protesters, characterizing them as extremists or terrorists and "new colonialists."[98] In Africa, for example, the head of Centre for African Prosperity, an Atlas Network affiliate, has emphasized that ensuring access to affordable electricity for vast numbers of people is a pressing priority for African policymakers. According to this narrative, continued extraction and use of fossil fuels using market-driven mechanisms is the way to address energy poverty in Africa. Climate policies that recommend moving away from fossil fuels are viewed as "a death sentence for Africans."[99] In this narrative, climate and environmental activists who oppose continued extraction and use of fossil fuels are characterized as "new colonialists" who wish to impose their choices on African people suffering from the lack of affordable electricity that fossil fuels could solve. Such narratives ignore a viable solution to the problem of ensuring access to affordable energy in Africa, the least electrified continent: a transition toward deploying the vast renewable energy resources endemic to Africa. Research suggests that the major impediment to resolving African energy poverty is the politics of foreign investment and lending to African economies.[100] Addressing this energy-finance gap in harnessing renewable energy resources is the real challenge, a position that contradicts the pro-fossil development views of the neoliberal/market-fundamentalist think tanks affiliated with the Atlas Network (see Chapter 5).[101]

Media Discourses of Climate Delay

While there is a significant body of research on climate misinformation in the Global North[102] (see Chapters 6 and 7), little is known about its spread

in Global South countries. Recent research provides some insights into the types of climate change misinformation campaigns disseminated via social media in China. One key element of the misinformation spread on these platforms is the reference to "expert sources" in posts about the environmental and health impacts of climate change that would likely be considered misinformation.[103] In some Indian newspapers, researchers found that the climate issue was framed primarily around the countries' historical and differentiated responsibilities. In particular, these messages emphasize that the Global North is the most responsible for emissions and should therefore be first to lead on decarbonization and global mitigation efforts.[104] These narratives also reflect, for example, the position of India's delegation at the UN climate meetings noted earlier, which has sought to emphasize the historical role of emissions. By emphasizing the failure of the Global North to support countries such as India and reduce emissions, such narratives minimize India's own contribution to GHG emissions and avoid reflecting on its mitigation efforts.[105]

COUNTERING CLIMATE OBSTRUCTION IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

Since the 1980s, environmental-justice campaigns have grown substantially in the Global South and have gained significant momentum since the 2000s, with a specific focus on the climate crisis.[106] This section highlights campaigns initiated by grassroots communities, environmentalists, and other civil- society actors that illustrate bottom-up challenges to the forces of climate obstruction, with an emphasis on rectifying environmental and climate injustices.

Major Indonesian NGOs such as WALHI (the Indonesian Forum for the Environment) have contested the country's National Strategic Projects (PSNs) which, though they include technological and renewable-energy developments and carbon-offset schemes—prioritize economic growth, job creation, and post-Covid economic recovery over GHG emission reduction.[107] WALHI has mobilized grassroots campaigns to address issues such as the PSNs' lack of environmental impact assessments and their potential for land loss and deforestation through the development of large-scale farms known as food estates.[108] Indonesia's commitment to build more coal-fired power plants for industrial users (captive power plants) demonstrates the lack of tangible success of such campaigns thus far.[109]

There have also been cases of environmental justice campaigns against South-South cooperation projects in the energy sector, which have also failed to achieve their desired outcomes. For example, a decade-long (2010–2020) mobilization by environmentalists against the building of coal-fired power plants and other industrial infrastructures near the Sundarbans, an ecologically fragile UNESCO World Heritage Site, was unable to persuade the Bangladeshi and Indian governments to cancel, halt, or relocate the project.[110]

The project was a joint venture financed by state-owned power corporations of India and Bangladesh, demonstrating how campaigns may be thwarted by the political environment in which they operate—in this case, a hybrid political regime characterized by authoritarianism and extractive political institutions.[111]

There have been some successes. In 2016, environmentalists and other civil-society actors in Sri Lanka mobilized grassroots communities to thwart the construction of a coal-fired power plant financed by India. In addition to the protesters' concern over the environmental and climate impacts of coal power, widespread mobilization against the power plant was galvanized by the land dispossession and security concerns of local communities that had been displaced to establish a high-security zone in the project area. After a Supreme Court ruling in favor of a Fundamental Rights Application submitted by a group of civil society actors led by the Environmental Foundation Limited (EFL), the Sri Lankan government decided not to go ahead with the project.[112] Eventually, in 2022, the Sri Lankan and Indian governments agreed to form a joint venture to build a solar power project instead.[113]

While public concern about climate change and desire to move toward a low-carbon future may be demonstrated in public opinion polls, there are distinct challenges faced by civil-society actors and environmentalists in some countries of the Global South. Kenyan climate justice movements, for example, reveal an interesting dimension of some campaigns to counter climate obstruction. According to one scholar, "Kenyan civil society actors rejected the Global South's climate justice argument because they believe one of its primary components—financial transfers—will be misused or misappropriated."[114] These movements demonstrate a somewhat pessimistic view due to lingering mistrust of their state and its reputation for official corruption as well as questions about their society's capacity to address climate change though technological advances and knowledge alone.

Similarly, there are currently few cohesive and comprehensive campaigns around climate change in Argentina.[115] Key informants from the environmental and academic sectors have held that a counternarrative to climate obstruction discourses has not yet been sufficiently consolidated. In turn, this limitation has been linked to the fragmentation of the environmental sector in Argentina and a lack of urgency among the public and the policy community around resolving the climate emergency. Researchers attribute this problem partly to discourses of national sovereignty and development that appear to stall mitigation efforts and a transition away from extractive industries, particularly because the country's development narrative plays a dominant role in stimulating the short-term economic growth supported by extractive industries.[116]

Finally, in the Global South there are legitimate risks associated with mobilization around climate and environmental injustice. On the front lines

of conservation, local and regional civil-society organizations and community groups—including Indigenous peoples—constitute a significant bulwark against local environmental destruction and biodiversity loss. Yet seeking to challenge the actions of climate obstruction activities facilitated by the state or large corporations presents a high risk of physical harm, especially if the defenders are impoverished, rural, Indigenous peoples, and/or women.[117] Indeed, deaths of environmental defenders have been well documented; they frequently face repression when challenging mining and extractive industries, agribusiness expansion, hydropower development, and logging.[118] These risks remain despite the success of some legal suits against harms to environmental defenders, such as the *Kawas v. Honduras* judgment in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which ruled that the state is obligated to protect environmental defenders experiencing human rights violations.[119]

CONCLUSION

Our study on the nature and dynamics of climate obstruction in the Global South yields three key findings. First, the legacy of resource and human exploitation has increased vulnerability to climate change in these regions. At the same time, the historical contributions of these countries to rising GHG emissions are less significant than those of the Global North. Recognizing this disparity and the disproportionate share of burden and responsibility, climate delay typically manifests in policy choices seeking to reconcile energy security and development goals with climate action. We suggest that such tactics and discourses of climate delay may be overcome by ensuring that international climate negotiations reduce the implementation barriers to distribution of adequate climate funding, which many Global South actors define as a crucial tool to achieve climate justice.

Second, states, carbon majors, corporations, and other actors frame fossil fuels and extractive industries as the primary instruments for development in the Global South. They also frame them as central to reducing poverty and countering the systematic harms of historical exploitation of many countries. To counter this narrative, we suggest that the Global North must take proactive action in supporting Global South countries to develop the required institutional, technological, and (again) financial capacities to move toward a just and equitable decarbonization process.

Third, sustained mobilizations organized by Indigenous peoples, civil-society actors, and social movements to resist attempts to delay climate action show mixed outcomes in the Global South. There are significant risks for those who challenge the actors and organizations behind these efforts, particularly where political conflict, corruption, or state and corporate crimes are

rampant. State agencies and the carbon majors, facing grassroots mobilizations confronting their policies and activities, must allow for the expression of dissent without fear or threat. The institutional practice of democratic deliberation at the local and national levels should also be strengthened to accommodate community concerns.

Research Gaps and Policy Lessons

Further research is needed for academics and policy practitioners to understand and confront the complexity of climate obstruction in the Global South. Scholars have noted several priorities for this research, discussed in this section.[120]

First, researchers should focus on furthering our understanding of developmentalism and the ways development discourses have played a fundamental role in the climate delay narratives and approaches to climate obstruction observed in the Global South. A key component of understanding climate obstruction in the Global North has been identifying the social, political, and economic forces that drive it. Therefore, it is likely that development and alternative- development models that emphasize extractive industries will similarly be entangled with climate obstruction in the Global South.

Second, armed with better insight on development discourses and practices, researchers should identify how they affect domestic-level actions that obstruct climate policies in the Global South as well as if and how they play out in creating stumbling blocks to stronger mitigation efforts in global climate negotiations.

Third, it is also important to examine how political leaders within Global South countries garner political support for stalling or intentionally delaying climate action.

Fourth, there seems to be a disconnection between public opinion in Global South countries and policy implementation. Thus, another important area for future research will be identifying which factors related to climate obstruction shape policy choices despite strong public opinion in favor of climate action.?

Fifth, researchers should also examine the influence of elite interests on both public opinion and policy choice to uncover the forces derailing public support for a transition toward renewable energy in some Global South countries. Such an endeavor might include a critical analysis of media narratives in both mainstream news and on social media. Researchers should also explore the role of the media in science education and climate justice and if and how narratives of denial and delay penetrate the public sphere in the Global South.

Finally, decarbonization rests fundamentally on the development of renewable-energy resources. However, evidence from the Global South reveals that renewable energy projects are often poorly financed and that these investments could potentially cause further environmental and social harm. Moreover, unlike fossil fuel–based energy projects, renewable energy projects do not require many workers and may offer precarious employment opportunities due to the nature of the industry. These issues might eventually produce an unjust energy transition for both new and old energy-sector workers. Moreover, the development of large-scale renewable-energy projects such as solar parks may involve land grabs and dispossession similar to that seen in predatory extractive resource-development projects.[121] Addressing these critical issues and avoiding their consequences require the urgent attention of policymakers.

NOTES

1. See Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Duke University Press, 2004).
2. Nour Dados and Raewyn Connell, "The Global South," *Contexts* 11, no. 1 (2012): 12–13.
3. Ibid., 13.
4. See J. Timmons Roberts and Bradley C. Parks, *A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North-South Politics, and Climate Policy* (The MIT Press, 2006).
5. David Ciplet and J. Timmons Roberts, "Splintering South: Ecologically Unequal Exchange Theory in a Fragmented Global Climate," in *Ecologically Unequal Exchange: Environmental Injustice in Comparative and Historical Perspective*, ed. R. Scott Frey, Paul K. Gellert, and Harry F. Dahms (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 273–305.
6. Ibid., 274.
7. Luke Taylor, "Colombia Announces Halt on Fossil Fuel Exploration for a Greener Economy," *The Guardian*, January 20, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/20/colombia-stop-new-oil-gas-exploration-davos.
8. Richard Marcantonio, Debra Javeline, Sean Field, and Agustin Fuentes, "Global Distribution and Coincidence of Pollution, Climate Impacts, and Health Risk in the Anthropocene," *PLOS One* 16, no. 7 (2021): e0254060; World Meteorological Organization, *State of the Climate in Africa 2021* (WMO, 2022).
9. Harald Fuhr, "The Rise of the Global South and the Rise in Carbon Emissions," *Third World Quarterly* 42, no. 11 (2021): 2724–2746.
10. , Jason Hickel, Christian Dorninger, Hanspeter Wieland, and Intan Suwandi, "Imperialist Appropriation in the World Economy: Drain from the Global South Through Unequal Exchange 1990–2015," *Global Environmental Change* 73, no. 102467 (2022): 1–13.
11. See Prakash Kashwan, *Democracy in the Woods: Environmental Conservation and Social Justice in India, Tanzania, and Mexico* (Oxford University Press, 2017).
12. Sikina Jinnah, "Makers, Takers, Shakers, Shapers: Emerging Economies and Normative Engagement in Climate Governance," *Global Governance* 23, no. 2 (2017): 285–306.

13. UNDP, "What Are the NDCs and How Do They Drive Climate Action?," May 31, 2023, https://climatepromise.undp.org/news-and-stories/NDCs-nationally-determined-contributions-climate-change-what-you-need-to-know.
14. Roberts and Parks, *A Climate of Injustice*.
15. Lisa Vanhala, Elisa Calliari, and Adelle Thomas, "Understanding the Politics and Governance of Climate Change Loss and Damage," *Global Environmental Politics* 23, no. 3 (2023): 1–11.
16. Ibid., 2.
17. Ibid.
18. Danielle Falzon, Fred Shaia, J. Timmons Roberts, Md Fahad Hossain, Stacy-ann Robinson, Mizan R. Khan, and David Ciplet, "Tactical Opposition: Obstructing Loss and Damage Finance in the United Nations Climate Negotiations," *Global Environmental Politics* 23, no. 3 (2023): 95–119.
19. Darren McCauley and Raphael Heffron, "Just Transition: Integrating Climate, Energy and Environmental Justice," *Energy Policy* 119 (2018): 1–7.
20. Fuhr, "The Rise of the Global South."
21. Arif Dirlik, "Developmentalism: A Critique," *Interventions* 16, no. 1 (2014): 30–48.
22. Frederick H. Buttel, "Ecological Modernization as Social Theory," in *The Ecological Modernisation Reader*, ed. Arthus P. J. Mol. David A. Sonnenfeld, and Gert Spaargaren (Routledge, 2009), 123–137.
23. Ibid.
24. Hilal Gezmiş, "From Neoliberalism to Neo-developmentalism? The Political Economy of Post-crisis Argentina (2002–2015)," *New Political Economy* 23, no. 1 (2018): 66–87.
25. Efe Can Gürcan, *Multipolarization, South-South Cooperation and the Rise of Post-hegemonic Governance* (Routledge, 2019).
26. Bas Hooijmaaijers, "China, the BRICS, and the Limitations of Reshaping Global Economic Governance," *The Pacific Review* 34, no. 1 (2021): 29–55.
27. Raul Gouvea, Dimitri Kapelianis, and Shihong Li, "Fostering Intra-BRICS Trade and Investment: The Increasing Role of China in the Brazilian and South African Economies," *Thunderbird International Business Review* 62, no. 1 (2020): 17–26.
28. Niall Duggan, Juan Carlos Ladines Azalia, and Marek Rewizorski, "The Structural Power of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in Multilateral Development Finance: A Case Study of the New Development Bank," *International Political Science Review* 43, no. 4 (2022): 495–511.
29. Zaki Laidi, "The BRICS Against the West?," *CERI Strategy Paper* 11, (2011): 1–12.
30. William F. Lamb, Thomas Wiedmann, Julia Pongratz, Robbie Andrew, Monica Crippa, Jos G. J. Olivier, Dominik Wiedenhofer, Guilio Mattioli, Alaa Al Khourdajie, Jo House, Shonali Pachauri, Maria Figueroa, Yamina Saheb, Raphael Slade, Klaus Hubacek, Laixing Sun, Suzana Kahn Ribeiro, Smail Khennas, Stephane de la Rue du Can, Lazarus Chapungu, Steven J Davis, Igor Bashmakov, Hancheng Dai, Shobhakar Dhakal, Xianchun Tan, Yong Geng, Baihe Gu, and Jan Minx, "A Review of Trends and Drivers of Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Sector from 1990 to 2018," *Environmental Research Letters* 16, no. 7 (2021): 073005.
31. Carlos R. S. Milani and Leonildes Nazar Chaves, "How and Why European and Chinese Pro-Climate Leadership may be Challenged by their Strategic Economic Interests in Brazil," *Asia Europe Journal* 20, no. 4 (2022): 403–422.
32. Climate Social Science Network (CSSN), "Dismantling the Environmental State: Actors, Strategies and Discourses Behind the Bolsonaro Attack on the National Environmental Regulation," CSSN Position Paper 3 (2021).

33. Dragana Ostic, Angelina Kissiwaa Twum, Andrew Osei Agyemang, and Helena Adu Boahen, "Assessing the Impact of Oil and Gas Trading, Foreign Direct Investment Inflows, and Economic Growth on Carbon Emission for OPEC Member Countries," *Environmental Science and Pollution Research* 29, no. 28 (2022): 43089–43101.
34. OPEC, "Our Mission," https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/23.htm (accessed March 31, 2025).
35. Sharon Shea, "Obstacles to Decarbonization in Southeast Asia," *AseanFocus* 1 (2023): 8–9.
36. Michael Jakob and Jan C. Steckel, *The Political Economy of Coal: Obstacles to Clean Energy Transitions* (Routledge, 2022), 364.
37. Paul K. Gellert and Paul S. Ciccantell, "Coal's Persistence in the Capitalist World-Economy: Against Teleology in Energy "Transition" Narratives," *Sociology of Development 6*, no. 2 (2020): 194–221; Richard York and Shannon E. Bell, "Energy Transitions or Additions?: Why a Transition from Fossil Fuels Requires More than the Growth of Renewable Energy," *Energy Research & Social Science* 51 (2019): 40–43.
38. Paul K. Gellert, "Neoliberalism and Altered State Developmentalism in the Twenty-First Century Extractive Regime of Indonesia," *Globalizations* 16, no. 6 (2019): 894–918.
39. Richard Clark, Noah Zucker, and Johannes Urpelainen, "The Future of Coal-Fired Power Generation in Southeast Asia," *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews* 121 (2020): 109650.
40. Maguire Gavin, "Vietnam's Coal Emissions Primed for Surge After Imports Jumped," Reuters, July 12, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/vietnams-coal-emissions-primed-surge-after-imports-jump-maguire-2023-07-12.
41. Maguire Gavin, "Philippines Set to Go from Renewable Laggard to Leader in SE Asia," Reuters, March 14, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/philippines-set-go-renewable-laggard-leader-se-asia-2023-03-14/.
42. Joseph Allchin, "Low-Lying Bangladesh Targets Jump in Coal Use," *Financial Times*, December 29, 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/241059fa-9424-11e5-bd82-c1fb87bef7af.
43. Niti Aayog, "India Climate and Energy Dashboard," https://iced.niti.gov.in/energy/electricity/generation (accessed March 31, 2025).
44. The Economist, "Why Is India Clinging to Coal?," November 16, 2021, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2021/11/16/why-is-india-clinging-to-coal.
45. Kathryn Hochstetler, *Political Economies of Energy Transition: Wind and Solar Power in Brazil and South Africa* (Cambridge University Press, 2021), 54.
46. BBC News, "Climate Change: Asia 'Coal Addiction' Must End, UN Chief Warns," November 2, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-50276983.
47. David Ciplet, J. Timmons Roberts, and Mizan R. Khan, *Power in a Warming World: The New Global Politics of Climate Change and the Remaking of Environmental Inequality* (MIT Press, 2015).
48. Greenpeace, "Coalruption: Shedding Light on Political Corruption in Indonesia's Coal Mining Sector," Greenpeace, 2018, https://www.greenpeace.org/static/planet4-indonesia-stateless/2018/12/727d7a2d-coalruption-english-web.pdf.
49. Mushtaq Khan, Mitchell Watkins, and Iffat Zahan, "De-Risking Private Power in Bangladesh: How Financing Design Can Stop Collusive Contracting," *Energy Policy* 168 (2022): 113146.

50. M. Omar Faruque, "Climate Crisis and the Politics of Low Carbon Energy Future in Emerging Economies," paper presented at the annual conference of the American Sociological Association, Philadelphia, 2023.
51. Patrik Oskarsson, Kenneth Bo Nielsen, Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, and Brototi Roy, "India's New Coal Geography: Coastal Transformations, Imported Fuel and State-Business Collaboration in the Transition to More Fossil Fuel Energy," *Energy Research & Social Science* 73 (2021): 101903; Brototi Roy and Anke Schaffartzik, "Talk Renewables, Walk Coal: The Paradox of India's Energy Transition," *Ecological Economics* 180 (2021): 106871.
52. The Economist, "India's Next Green Revolution," October 20, 2022, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/10/20/indias-next-green-revolution.
53. Kathryn Hochstetler, *Political Economies of Energy Transition: Wind and Solar Power in Brazil and South Africa* (Cambridge University Press, 2021).
54. Ryna Cui, Fabby Tumiwa, Alicia Zhao, Deon Arinaldo, Raden Wiranegara, Diyang Cui, Camryn Dahl, Lauri Myllyvirta, Claire Squire, Pamela Simamora, and Nate Hultman, *Financing Indonesia's Coal Phase-Out: A Just and Accelerated Retirement Pathway to Net-Zero* (Institute for Essential Services Reform, 2022).
55. Chika Izuora, "African Oil Producers Back OPEC Output Cut," 2022, https://leadership.ng/african-oil-producers-back-opec-output-cut/.
56. Andrzej Polus and Wojciech Tycholiz, "David versus Goliath: Tanzania's Efforts to Stand Up to Foreign Gas Corporations," *Africa Spectrum* 54, no. 1 (2019): 61–72.
57. United Nations, "South-South Cooperation," 2019, https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/intergovernmental-coordination/south-south-cooperation-2019.html.
58. Branislav Gosovic, "The Resurgence of South–South Cooperation," *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (2016): 733–743.
59. Lihuan Zhou, Sean Gilbert, Ye Wang, Miquel Muñoz Cabré, and Kevin P. Gallagher, "Moving the Green Belt and Road Initiative: From Words to Actions," Working Paper, World Resource Institute, 2018.
60. Wei Yin, "Integrating Sustainable Development Goals into the Belt and Road Initiative: Would It Be a New Model for Green and Sustainable Investment?," *Sustainability* 11, no. 24 (2019): 6991.
61. Government of Bangladesh, *Bangladesh Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)* (Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, 2021).
62. Kelly Sims Gallagher, Rishikesh Bhandary, Easwaran Narassimhan, and Quy Tam Nguyen, "Banking on Coal? Drivers of Demand for Chinese Overseas Investments in Coal in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and Vietnam," *Energy Research & Social Science* 71 (2021): 101827.
63. Lucas G. Christel, Ricardo A. Gutiérrez and Elisabeth Möhle, "Climate Action and Obstruction in Argentina from the Actors' View," paper presented at the 27th World Congress of Political Science, Buenos Aires, 2023.
64. International Energy Agency, "Natural Gas," https://www.iea.org/energy-system/fossil-fuels/natural-gas (accessed March 31, 2025).
65. OPEC, "Bulletin 2-3/22," 2022, https://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/OB02_032022.pdf.
66. Yin, "Integrating Sustainable Development Goals."
67. Rilus A. Kinseng et al., "Unraveling Disputes Between Indonesia and the European Union on Indonesian Palm Oil: From Environmental Issues to National Dignity," *Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy* 19, no. 1 (2023): 2152626.

68. Ruth E. McKie, "Climate Change Counter Movement Neutralization Techniques: A Typology to Examine the Climate Change Counter Movement," *Sociological Inquiry* 89, no. 2 (2019): 288–316.
69. DeSmogblog, "Civil Society Coalition on Climate Change," https://www.desmogblog.com/civil-society-coalition-climate-change/ (accessed March 31, 2025).
70. Ruth E. McKie, *The Climate Change Counter Movement: How the Fossil Fuel Industry Sought to Delay Climate Action* (Springer International, 2023), 139–167.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Climate Bonds Initiative, "Climate Bonds Initiative Is the International Organization Working to Mobilize Global Capital for Climate Action," https://www.climatebonds.net/about (accessed March 31, 2025).
75. United Nations Brazil, "Adoção de títulos verdes para concessões ferroviárias é impulsionada por PNUD e Ministério da Infraestrutura," July 28, 2021, https://brasil.un.org/pt-br/137698-ado%C3%A7%C3%A3o-de-t%C3%ADtulos-verdes-para-concess%C3%B5es-ferrovi%C3%A1rias-%C3%A9-impulsionada-por-pnud-e-minist%C3%A9rio.
76. Marianna Duarte De Aragão, "Brazil Hopes Green Debt Will Help Fund $3.1 Billion Amazon-Crossing Railway," *Bloomberg*, November 28, 2019.
77. Rafael Araújo, Juliano Assunção, Arthur Bragança, *Policy Brief: The Environmental Impacts of the Ferrogrão Railroad: An Ex-Ante Evaluation of Deforestation Risks* (Climate Policy Initiative, 2020).
78. International Labour Organization (ILO), *Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169)* (ILO, 1989).
79. V.a., *Carta Conjunta Kayapó e Munduruku ao Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU)*, February 23, 2021, https://site-antigo.socioambiental.org/sites/blog.socioambiental.org/files/nsa/arquivos/carta_para_o_tcu.pdf; Isabel Harari, *Indígenas exigem direito à Consulta prévia na fase do planejamento da Ferrogrão*, March 1, 2021, Instituto Socioambiental.
80. Stockholm Resilience Center, "Planetary Boundaries," https://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/planetary-boundaries/the-nine-planetary-boundaries.html (accessed March 31, 2025).
81. Alister Doyle and Tommy Wilkes, "Fueling Its Growth with Coal, India Champions the Poor in Paris," Reuters, December 6, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-climatechange-summit-india-idAFKBN0TO0S720151206.
82. Prakash Kashwan, ed., *Climate Justice in India* (Cambridge University Press, 2022).
83. Sjur Kasa, Anne T. Gullberg, and Gørild Heggelund, "The Group of 77 in the International Climate Negotiations: Recent Developments and Future Directions," *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 8 (2008): 113–127.
84. Ibid.
85. J. Timmons Roberts and Robert J. Brulle, "Conclusions: Ten Lessons about Climate Obstruction in Europe," in *Climate Obstruction in Europe*, ed. Robert J. Brulle, J. Timmons Roberts, and Miranda C. Spencer (Oxford University Press, 2024), 347–364.
86. World Bank, "Colombia: Leading the Path to Sustainability in Latin America," September 7, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2022/08/31/colombia-leading-the-path-to-sustainability-in-latin-america.

87. Mining Technology, "Coal Production in Colombia and Major Projects," 2023, https://www.mining-technology.com/data-insights/coal-in-colombia/.
88. Union of Concerned Scientists, "Report from COP27: The Fossil Fuel Industry Continues to Block the Path to Climate Justice," November 14, 2022, https://blog.ucsusa.org/delta-merner/report-from-cop27-the-fossil-fuel-industry-continues-to-block-the-path-to-climate-justice/.
89. Rodrigues, Patricia, "Is Colombia One Step Away from a Fracking Ban?," NACLA, February 8, 2023, https://nacla.org/colombia-one-step-away-fracking-ban.
90. European Investment Bank, "9 Colombians in 10 Demand Stricter Climate Policies: New Survey Reveals," September 4, 2023, https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2023-306-nearly-9-chileans-in-10-demand-stricter-climate-policies-eib-survey-reveals.
91. McKie, *The Climate Change Counter Movement*, 19–50.
92. United Nations Environment Program, "Environment Security," https://www.unep.org/topics/disasters-and-conflicts/environment-security (accessed March 31, 2025).
93. B. Poornima and Rashmi Ramesh, "Yemen's Survival Quandary: The Compounding Effects of Conflict and Climate Obstruction," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 18, no.3 (2023): 264-279
94. Carlos A. Nobre, Gilvan Sampaio, Laura S. Borma, Juan Carlos Castilla-Rubio, José S. Silva, and Manoel Cardoso, "Land-use and Climate Change Risks in the Amazon and the Need of a Novel Sustainable Development Paradigm," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 113, no. 39 (2016): 10759–10768.
95. Kristoffer Ekberg, Bernhard Forchtner, Martin Hultman and Kirsti M. Jylhä, *Climate Obstruction: How Denial, Delay and Inaction are Heating the Planet* (Routledge, 2023); Donald Gutstein, *The Big Stall: How Big Oil and Think tanks are Blocking Action on Climate Change in Canada* (James Lorimer & Company, 2018); Nuria Almiron, Jose A. Moreno, and Justin Farrell, "Climate Change Contrarian Think tanks in Europe: A Network Analysis," *Public Understanding of Science 32, no.*3 (2023): 268–283.
96. Quinn Slobodian and Dieter Plehwe (eds.), *Market Civilizations: Neoliberals East and South* (Princeton University Press, 2022).
97. McKie, *The Climate Change Counter Movement*.
98. Lyndal Rowlands, Julianna Merullo, Amy Westervelt, and Geoff Dembicki, "How Think Tanks Laid the Groundwork to Criminalize Protest," September 12, 2023, https://drilled.media/news/trfst-atlas.
99. Magatte Wade, "The COP26 Plan to Keep Africa Poor," *Wall Street Journal*, November 26, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-cop26-plan-to-keep-africa-poor-climate-change-clean-energy-11637964581.
100. Rebekah Shirley, "The Clean Energy Hub of the Future," YouTube, March 13, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g9VFlXF47f0.
101. Michael Olabisi, Robert B. Richardson, and Adesoji O. Adelaja, "The Next Global Crisis: Africa's Renewable Energy Financing Gap," *Climate and Development* 15, no. 6 (2023): 501–508.
102. Stephan Lewandowsky and Sander Van Der Linden, "Countering Misinformation and Fake News through Inoculation and Prebunking," *European Review of Social Psychology* 32, no. 2 (2021): 348–384; John Cook, "Understanding and Countering Misinformation About Climate Change," in *Research Anthology on Environmental and Societal Impacts of Climate Change*, ed. Information Resources

Management Association (IGI Global, 2022), 1633–1658; Ahmed Al-Rawi, Derrick O'Keefe, Oumar Kane, and Aimé-Jules Bizimana, "Twitter's Fake News Discourses around Climate Change and Global Warming," *Frontiers in Communication* 6 (2021), https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2021.729818.

103. Jianxun Chu, Yuqi Zhu, and Jiaojiao Ji, "Characterizing the Semantic Features of Climate Change Misinformation on Chinese Social Media," *Public Understanding of Science* 32, no. 7 (2023): 845–859.
104. Ranjini Murali, Aishwarya Kuwar, and Harini Nagendra, "Who's Responsible for Climate Change? Untangling Threads of Media Discussions in India, Nigeria, Australia, and the USA," *Climatic Change* 164 (2021): 1–20.
105. Ibid.
106. Paul Almeida, "Climate Justice and Sustained Transnational Mobilization," *Globalizations*16, no. 7 (2019): 973–979.
107. Ade Thea, "Tiga Kritik Walhi Terhadap Perpres Percepatan Proyek Strategis Nasional," *Hukum Online*, December 1, 2020, https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/tiga-kritik-walhi-terhadap-perpres-percepatan-proyek-strategis-nasional-lt5fc5faf7b65e9/.
108. Takeshi Ito, Noer Fauzi Rachman and Laksmi A. Savitri, "Power to Make Land Dispossession Acceptable: A Policy Discourse Analysis of the Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE), Papua, Indonesia," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 41, no. 1 (2014): 29–50.
109. Hans Nicholas Jong, "Captive to Coal: Indonesia to Burn Even More Fossil Fuel for Green Tech," *Mongabay News*, August 10, 2023, https://news.mongabay.com/2023/08/captive-to-coal-indonesia-to-burn-even-more-fossil-fuel-for-green-tech/.
110. Jeremy Hance, "Thousands to March Against Coal Plant Threat to Bangladesh's Sundarbans Forest," *The Guardian*, March 2, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/mar/02/thousands-to-march-protest-coal-plant-threat-bangladeshs-sundarbans-forest.
111. M. Omar Faruque, "Slow Violence, Environmental Governance, and Social Movement Outcomes in a Hybrid Regime," paper presented at the virtual annual conference of the British Sociological Association, 2022.
112. Gz. MeeNilankco Theiventhran,"Energy as a Geopolitical Battleground in Sri Lanka," *Asian Geographer* 41, no. 1 (2024): 21–45; Environmental Foundation Limited (EFL), "Halting the Coal Power Plant in Sampur," https://efl.lk/portfolio/halting-the-coal-power-plant-in-sampur/ (accessed March 31, 2025).
113. Meera Srinivasan, "NTPC Returns to Sri Lanka's Sampur with Solar Project," *The Hindu*, March 12, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/ntpc-returns-to-sri-lankas-sampur-with-solar-project/article65217041.ece.
114. Christopher Todd Beer, "Climate Justice, the Global South, and Policy Preferences of Kenyan Environmental NGOs," *The Global South* 8, no. 2 (2014): 98.
115. Christel et al., "Climate Action and Obstruction in Argentina from the Actors' View."
116. Janaina B. Pinto, Arthur Facini and Carlos R. S. Milani, "Climate Change, Denial and Politics of Obstruction in Brazil: Building Conceptual and Empirical Blocks," paper presented at 27th World Congress of Political Science, Buenos Aires, 2023.
117. Dalena Tran, "Gendered Violence Martyring Filipina Environmental Defenders," *The Extractive Industries and Society* 13 (2023): 101211.
118. Kate Hallam, "Environmental Defenders: Murdered, Missing and at Risk," *Socialist Lawyer* 75 (2017): 40–43.

119. Lauri R.Tanner, "Kawas v. Honduras–Protecting Environmental Defenders," *Journal of Human Rights Practice* 3, no. 3 (2011): 309–326.
120. Guy Edwards, Paul K. Gellert, Omar Faruque, Kathryn Hochstetler, Pamela D. McElwee, Prakash Kaswhan, Ruth E. McKie, Carlos Milani, Timmons Roberts, and Jonathan Walz, "Climate Obstruction in the Global South: Future Research Trajectories," *PLOS Climate* 2, no. 7 (2023): e0000241. It is important to note that many contributors of this chapter were also involved in developing those research priorities analyzed in this source.
121. Ryan Stock and Trevor Birkenholtz, "The Sun and the Scythe: Energy Dispossessions and the Agrarian Question of Labor in Solar Parks," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 48, no. 5 (2021): 984–1007; Ryan Stock, "Triggering Resistance: Contesting the Injustices of Solar Park Development in India," *Energy Research & Social Science* 86 (2022): 102464; Priti Gupta, "India's Solar-Powered Future Clashes with Local Life," BBC, October 13, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-62848096.